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Innovation’s private value is typically less 
than its social value, so to encourage innova-
tion, researchers in economics and strategy 
have focused on how innovators can appropri-
ate value across different economic, institu-
tional, and strategic environments (Teece 1986; 
Gans and Stern 2003). For sta rt-ups without 
 pre-existing assets such as manufacturing capa-
bilities or brand reputation, researchers have 
identified appropriability through formal intel-
lectual property protection (which we will refer 
to as a “control” approach) and  first-mover com-
petitive advantage (which we will refer to as an 
“execution” approach) as distinct paths.
Most research has taken a  start-up’s appro-
priability regime as exogenous, i.e., environ-
mentally determined (e.g.,  control-orientation 
in biotechnology, and  execution-orientation in 
Internet software). This paper develops a simple 
model highlighting the interplay between con-
trol and execution as alternative routes to appro-
priability. Whereas a control strategy allows an 
innovator to forestall imitation once established, 
control itself takes time, and so can delay market 
entry. In contrast, an execution strategy is pre-
mised on taking advantage of the benefits aris-
ing from rapid market entry such as customer 
learning, reputational advantages, or coordina-
tion on a standard. Does the  start-up shield itself 
from competition through investing in entry 
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barriers or does it invest in dynamic capabilities 
allowing it to “get ahead, stay ahead”?
We derive two main results. First, the choices 
of control and execution are strategic substi-
tutes. Notably, when the ability to learn from 
early customer feedback in the marketplace is 
sufficiently high, an entrepreneur might choose 
not to invest in intellectual property protection 
even if such protection is costless and effective. 
Second, the choice between control and execu-
tion interacts with other key strategic choices 
such as whether to pursue a narrow or broad 
customer segment, or whether to commercialize 
a “minimal viable product” versus a more robust 
version. Innovation appropriability depends not 
only on the instruments available to an innova-
tor, but on how those instruments interact with 
each other as part of the firm’s (endogenous) 
entrepreneurial strategy (see Ching, Gans, and 
Stern 2016; Gans, Stern, and Wu 2016).
I. The Model
We consider an entrepreneur, who has already 
developed an idea with a maximal (social) value 
in any given period, equal to one. To introduce 
an innovation, the innovator incurs a  one-time 
sunk development cost C, and each firm oper-
ating in the market incurs a  per-period fixed 
operating cost of c (< 1); the potential net pres-
ent value of the market is, therefore,  1 − c ____
1 − δ − C , where δ is the discount rate.
Innovators can lose their ability to capture 
value in two ways: imitation and competitive 
 follow-on innovation. Imitation occurs in period 
t + 1 (with certainty, and resulting in subsequent 
profits of zero) if the idea is introduced into the 
market in t without any intellectual property pro-
tection and the  start-up does not undertake activ-
ities during t to obtain a period t + 1 advantage 
over potential rivals. Alternatively, the potential 
for  follow-on innovation arises each period with 
probability λ, and this can be introduced by 
the  start-up or a competitor (depending on the 
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appropriability regime) at an incremental sunk 
cost of C (for simplicity, we assume the value 
of the market remains the same (i.e., one) over 
time).
If the innovator releases the product to the 
market without intellectual property protection 
or capabilities for future advantage, they enjoy 
a  single-period of monopoly followed by com-
plete loss of appropriability (we refer to this 
possibility as opportunistic entry).
Entrepreneurs can mitigate this through 
control and/or execution. Under control, the 
 start-up delays product launch until their ability 
to control their innovation has been established 
through mechanisms such as formal intellec-
tual property protection,  contract-based con-
trol mechanisms, or product design approaches 
such as through the establishment of propri-
etary architectures. The key assumption is that 
control takes time to establish. We focus on the 
case where the only cost of control is an oppor-
tunity cost (i.e., there are zero financial costs). 
The control strategy is assumed to yield two 
distinct benefits: precluding imitative compe-
tition (with probability one) and, for any new 
 follow-on innovation opportunity, allows the 
 start-up to have priority over that subsequent 
innovation with probability α (e.g., as a mea-
sure of intellectual property breadth).
Under execution, there is immediate product 
introduction at a  per-period incremental cost 
e ( < 1 − c ), yielding two distinct benefits. First, 
the  start-up establishes a marginal cost advan-
tage over potential rivals in the subsequent 
period (though these capabilities decay after one 
period and so require reinvestment each period). 
Second, the  start-up can sense and take advan-
tage of  follow-on innovation opportunities that 
match these capabilities with probability β (a 
measure of the impact of product market learn-
ing on their ability to “get ahead, stay ahead”). 
As such, under both control and execution, an 
entrepreneur has the possibility to secure rents 
from  follow-on innovations.
II. Control versus Execution
There are four appropriability strategies: 
opportunistic entry, control, execution, or both. 
Taking advantage of the fact that the optimal 
strategy will be independent of whether that was 
the initial innovation opportunity or a subse-
quent  follow-on innovation opportunity (and so 
the strategy is  state-independent), we can com-
pare each strategy’s stationary net present value.
Opportunistic Entry.—The entrepreneur 
commercializes the product immediately at 
a cost C and has the market to themselves for 
one period. However, imitative entry in the 
next period and beyond results in a total loss of 
appropriability. Under opportunistic entry, the 
entrepreneur earns
(1)  v OE  − C = 1 − c − C ⇒  v OE = 1 − c .
Control.—The entrepreneur establishes con-
trol after a  one-period delay but loses control 
each period (including during the time before 
they initially come to market) with probability λ( 1 − α). The net present value is
(2)  v CON = δ   (1 − λ (1 − α) ) (1 − c )  − λαC   ___________________  1 −  (1 − λ (1 − α) ) δ .
Execution.—The entrepreneur enters imme-
diately but incurs an incremental  per-period 
cost to develop capabilities that foreclose imi-
tative entry and gain an advantage on access to 
 follow-on innovation:
(3)  v EXE =  1 − c − e − λβδC  _____________ 
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − β) ) δ. 
Control and Execution.—This involves the 
entrepreneur pursuing both strategies, which 
allows them to exploit both directions in sus-
taining leadership, but also they must incur both 
costs. Their product introduction is delayed for 
one period yet they must incur the execution 
cost e in all periods:
(4)  v BOTH =
 
− e +  (1 − λ (1 − α) (1 − β) ) δ(1 − c )  − λ(α + β − αβ) δC
    ______________________________________
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − α) (1 − β) ) δ  .
Comparing these yields our first result.
PROPOSITION 1: Control and execution are 
substitute strategies.
This means that the marginal return to either 
approach is reduced if the other is being under-
taken (i.e.,  v BOTH −  v EXE ≤  v CON −  v OE ). This 
condition holds because while both strategies 
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have distinct costs, both strategies yield a sim-
ilar benefit—the deterrence of  short-term entry 
and the potential to forestall  follow-on innova-
tion competition. While the costs of each strat-
egy are independent, the marginal benefit of 
each is reduced when the other strategy is also 
implemented. For  start-ups, where both human 
and financial resources are highly constrained, 
there will be a meaningful  trade-off between an 
investment in the types of activities that would 
allow the firm to forestall imitation or gain a 
legal right to block  follow-on innovation ver-
sus those activities that would focus the young 
firm on learning about customers or develop-
ing the capabilities required to “get ahead, stay 
ahead.” As we emphasize in Ching, Gans, and 
Stern (2016), a particularly interesting case to 
consider is when, because of uncertainty about 
how each strategy will be realized in the market, 
the  start-up is unable to rank these alternatives 
in terms of their ability to forestall  follow-on 
innovative entry by competitors (i.e.,  α = β ). In 
this scenario, execution will be preferred to con-
trol if  1 − δ (1 − λ (1 − β) ) >  e ____ 1 − c . Execution 
is chosen when the rate of generation of prod-
uct innovations is high, or the ability to lever-
age current incumbency into future leadership 
is low. As well, for a sufficiently low discount 
factor (i.e., when the  start-up is impatient to 
earn revenue), execution will again be preferred. 
Importantly, we find that a  start-up innovator 
may choose to forego intellectual property as 
part of their optimal strategy even when formal 
intellectual property protection is costless and 
yields strict appropriability once established. 
Finally, when the new (patentable) product rate (λ) is rapid, execution is more likely, lowering 
observed patent rates.
III. Entrepreneurial Strategy Complementarities
We now consider how the appropriability 
choice interacts with other elements of entrepre-
neurial strategy.
A. Customer
For a given innovation, a  start-up often 
faces a choice of whether to focus initially on 
a niche customer base or attempt to appeal to 
the mass market. Targeting a smaller customer 
segment comes at the expense of demand but 
offers the potential for a lower cost of learning 
about  customers (allowing the firm to maintain a 
dynamic advantage over imitative rivals).
How does this customer choice relate to the 
choice between control and execution? Consider 
a  start-up who is considering a market segment 
size choice,  σ < 1 , where the net returns each 
period are  σ − c(σ) where c is an increasing 
and convex function of σ. The variable σ both 
determines the size of the (served) market each 
period, and impacts the  per-period cost of mar-
ket operation (since serving a larger market is 
more expensive at an increasing rate). As well, 
suppose that the choice of σ impacts the cost of 
implementing an  execution-oriented approach: 
e is also an increasing function of σ; in other 
words, with a broader market segment, the 
 start-up faces a higher cost of effort to maintain 
dynamic capabilities that forestall imitative entry 
and allow for a higher chance of taking advan-
tage of  follow-on innovation opportunities ( β ). 
Contrast this with the cost structure associated 
with a  control-oriented strategy. Control costs—
such as obtaining formal intellectual property 
protection or proprietary product design—are 
largely independent of the size of the market 
being served. At the same time, the ability to 
use control over a design and customer base in 
the current generation as a means for deterring 
 follow-on innovation competition in subsequent 
generations is likely enhanced (at least on the 
margin) when the  start-up serves more custom-
ers initially. In other words, α is also a function 
of σ ( α′ (σ) ≥ 0 ); the larger the market you 
acquire, the easier it is to defend market leader-
ship against  follow-on innovation. The resulting 
optimization problem for the  start-up establishes 
complementarity between market size and the 
choice of appropriability regime.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that  e′ (σ) > 0 and α′ (σ) ≥ 0 . Let  σ ⁎ (s) be the optimal customer 
share of the entrepreneur under  s ∈ {EXE, CON} , 
respectively. Then  σ ⁎ (EXE) <  σ ⁎ (CON) .
PROOF: 
In a period where control is chosen the opti-
mal share is determined by
  ma x σ {−C +  (1 − λ(1 − α(σ))) δ (σ − c (σ) 
 +  v CON ) − λα (σ) δC}. 
MAY 2017320 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
This gives a first order condition:
 λα′ (σ) δ (σ − c (σ) +  v CON − C) 
  +  (1 − λ(1 − α(σ))) δ (1 − c′ (σ) ) = 0 .
The first term is positive, implying that 
 1 ≤ c′(  σ ⁎ (CON)) .
For a period where execution is chosen, the 
optimal share is determined by
   ma x σ {−C + σ − c (σ) − e(σ)
  +  (1 − λ(1 − β)) δ  v EXE − λβδC}. 
This gives a first order condition:  1 − c′ (σ) = e′ (σ) implying that  1 > c′( σ ⁎ (EXE) ) . 
Recalling that c is convex completes the proof. ∎
Intuitively, the efficacy of control (versus 
execution) is enhanced if the  start-up secures 
a larger customer base. Though obviously sim-
plified, this result suggests that we will observe 
an execution strategy associated with a smaller 
initial customer base upon launch than a control 
strategy; recalling that in the latter case, product 
launch comes later.
B. Technology
A second domain for strategic choice on the 
part of a  start-up innovator is whether to bring 
an  early-stage version of their product to market 
to receive customer feedback before undertak-
ing subsequent R&D investment (a “minimum 
viable product” in the terminology of the “lean 
 start-up” movement) or whether to ensure that 
the first product is robust with a high level of 
functionality and reliability. To see how this 
choice of whether to release a “beta” version of 
a product interacts with the control/execution 
choice, consider an alternative to our baseline 
model where the entrepreneur can forego pay-
ing the fixed product development cost C, and 
instead immediately come to market with an 
“MVP” that involves a lower value for each con-
sumer,  u MVP < 1 , and a higher  per-period cost of 
serving the market,  c MVP > c . To ensure that an 
investment in execution remains a viable strategy, 
assume that  ( u MVP −  c MVP ) > e. Finally, assume 
that the  start-up cannot rank the  long-term prof-
itability of alternative commercialization paths (i.e.,  α = β ). The  start-up  innovator, therefore, 
faces the simultaneous choice between control 
and execution and a choice between an MVP or 
traditional product development approach.
PROPOSITION 3: For  α = β , an MVP is a com-
plement (substitute) to execution (control).
PROOF: 
Note that the return to execution versus con-
trol (under MVP) is
 
 ( u MVP −  c MVP ) − e
  _____________ 
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − β) ) δ
  − δ   (1 − λ (1 − α) ) ( u MVP −  c MVP )    ____________________ 
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − α) ) δ  .
While without MVP the relative return to exe-
cution is
 δ   (1 − λ (1 − β) ) (1 − c − e) − λβC    _____________________________  
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − β) ) δ 
  − δ   (1 − λ (1 − α) ) (1 − c) − λαC    __________________________  
1 −  (1 − λ (1 − α) ) δ .
An MVP will be a complement with execution 
if the relative return to execution rises when an 
MVP is chosen, i.e., if
 u MVP −  c MVP − e
 − δ (1 − λ (1 − β) ) (1 − c − e) + λβC 
  >  (1 − λ (1 − α) ) δ ( u MVP −  c MVP −  (1 − c) ) 
 + λαC 
  ⇒  ( u MVP −  c MVP ) > e ,
which is true by assumption. The substitution 
result is the symmetric dual of this result. ∎
Put simply, both execution and an MVP 
product development strategy prioritize early 
marketplace introduction at the expense of the 
establishment of  long-term competitive advan-
tage. Control involves more patience because 
of implementation delays, and this is comple-
mentary to a product development approach that 
focuses on “getting the product right.”
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C. Identity
We finally consider how appropriability strat-
egy depends on the “identity” of the  start-up 
founders themselves. The opportunity cost of 
time borne by the  start-up to engage in execu-
tion, the costs of navigating complex business 
activities associated with control, or even the 
innovator’s discount rate are likely to depend not 
simply on technology and market characteristics, 
but on the identity of the  start-up innovators. For 
example, these parameters are likely different 
for younger innovators (e.g., students who have 
a low cost of time but who are unfamiliar with 
complex business processes) than more sea-
soned innovators such as a serial entrepreneur 
or faculty member. As such, execution will have 
higher returns for younger, less experienced 
founders while control will have relatively high 
returns for more senior experienced innovators. 
In Ching, Gans, and Stern (2016), we explore 
this by focusing on a sample of  paper-start-up 
pairs (i.e., innovations from publications jointly 
authored by faculty and students resulting in 
a new firm). We find that  faculty-led  start-ups 
are more heavily oriented toward formal intel-
lectual property rights, while  student-led firms 
are more timely in their speed from publication 
to firm founding, first funding, and first product 
introduction.
V. Conclusion
Our objective has been simply to raise the 
prospect that the realized appropriability regime 
governing an innovation depends not only on 
the instruments available to an innovator to pro-
tect private returns, but how those instruments 
interact with each other as part of the firm’s 
entrepreneurial strategy. This approach stands 
in contrast to most research that has taken the 
 appropriability regime to be an exogenous fea-
ture of the environment. Control and execution 
are not simply two mechanisms for appropri-
ability, but can be strategic substitutes, and so 
 start-up innovators will choose between them 
as they consider how to commercialize their 
innovations. In some cases, appropriability may 
require investments in both control and execu-
tion so they may be correlated (Ching, Gans, 
and Stern 2016 find evidence for substitutabil-
ity). When  start-ups face a clear choice, this 
interacts in natural and potentially testable ways 
with other elements of the firm’s entrepreneur-
ial strategy (Gans, Stern, and Wu 2016). How 
these arise in practice and the nature of entrepre-
neurial choice are promising avenues for further 
research.
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